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ABSTRACT 
 
Adopting Berrendonner’s (1990), (2002) and Berrendonner et al.’s (forthcoming) 
distinction between “micro-syntax” and “macro-syntax”, as well as the orthogonal 
dichotomy between foregrounded and backgrounded discourse segments (cf. Khalil 
2005), this paper aims to examine certain “non-canonical” interactions amongst these 
domains. In particular, it analyses instances where a potential referent is evoked within 
a highly presupposed, discursively backgrounded text segment, but where that referent 
is targeted via an “anadeictic” indexical expression and may be made into a discourse 
entity in its own right. This last-mentioned use is characteristic of discourse deixis, but 
not of anaphora as such. The paper also examines larger stretches of text, which relate 
to each other discursively in terms of “macro-syntax”. The overall aim is to characterise 
the limits of discourse-anaphoric reference as a function of the degree of backgrounding 
or foregrounding of the discourse units in terms of which the referent is determined and 
targeted. 
  
Keywords: foregrounding, backgrounding, discourse, anaphora, macro-syntax, micro-
syntax 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper’s goal is to determine the ways in which discourse-anaphoric and 
“anadeictic” reference is affected by the syntactic (textual) and discursive relations 
obtaining between the antecedent and indexical segments in a text. I will be making use 
of Berrendonner’s (1990), (2002) and Berrendonner et al.’s (forthcoming) distinction 
between “micro-syntax” and “macro-syntax”, as well as of the orthogonal relationship 
between degrees of foregrounding or backgrounding exhibited by certain discourse 
segments (cf. Khalil 2005). In this respect, I will examine in particular instances where 
a potential referent is evoked within a highly presupposed, discursively backgrounded 
textual segment in some text (for example, a restrictive relative clause, or a complement 
clause — both of which assume a micro-structural relation with their containing clause), 
but where that referent is targeted via an anadeictically-used indexical and may be made 
into a discourse entity in its own right. This last-mentioned use is the province of 
discourse deixis, but not of discourse anaphora as such. Comparisons will be made 
between relations involving clause-sized segments (illustrated in sections 2-4, in 
particular) and larger stretches of text, which relate to each other discursively in terms 
of “macro-syntax” (section 5). The article attempts to determine the limits of potential 
discourse-anaphoric reference in terms of the backgrounded or foregrounded status of 
the discourse units within which the referent is specified. 
I begin by briefly outlining Berrendonner’s distinction between the levels of 
“micro-” and “macro-syntax” (section 2), and then sketch the orthogonal distinction 
between foregrounded and backgrounded discourse units of various sizes in terms of 
Khalil’s (2005) account (section 3). Having done this, I differentiate in section 4 
amongst discourse anaphora, ‘strict’ anadeixis and discourse deixis. This leads to the 
main focus of the paper (section 5), namely the correlations that may hold between the 
operation of discourse deixis, ‘strict’ anadeixis and discourse anaphora, on the one 
hand, and the status of the discourse units targeted by these context-bound referring 
procedures as foregrounded or backgrounded units, on the other. We will see that 
referring via indexicals is not just a question of targeting individual referents, but 
involves “knitting” two entire discourse units together in terms of foreground-
background relations.  
 
2. “Micro-” vs. “macro-syntax”  
 
There are in fact several extant conceptions of the micro- vs. macro-syntax distinction: 
the Fribourg one (represented here by Berrendonner), the Aix one (developed by the 
GARS/DELIC research group: see Blanche-Benveniste 2002) and the Florence school 
one (associated with the LABLITA research unit). See Avanzi (2007) for an 
illuminating comparison of these different approaches. In Berrendonner’s (1990), 
(2002) and Berrendonner et al.’s (forthcoming) conception, micro- and macro-syntax 
are types of ways in which more basic units within each domain may be integrated into 
a larger, more encompassing structure.  In the case of micro-syntax, these units are 
lexical heads, phrases and clauses,1 and in that of macro-syntax, they are minimal 
                                                
1 I am using this term in its general sense in linguistics. This is not to be confused with Berrendonner’s usage of this 
term, which characterizes the constituent that is the maximal unit within “micro-syntax”.  
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discourse units. While micro-syntax is the domain of government (French “rection”) by 
phrasal heads of their complement(s) and by groups and phrases of their modifiers or 
adjuncts, macro-syntax (also termed “pragma-syntax”: i.e. the lexico-grammatical as 
well as discourse relations spanning adjacent sentences or clauses within a text) is the 
domain of coherence or rhetorical relations between discourse units, each of which may 
serve to augment the discourse model (“mémoire discursive”) being constructed as the 
co-text unfolds.  
One central initial test —though currently under discussion: cf. Berrendonner et 
al. (forthcoming)— of whether a given unit is related to another in terms of micro- or 
macro-syntax is the possibility of felicitously using an appropriate definite lexically-
headed NP to replace a 3rd person pronoun in the second unit which is in some 
anaphoric relation with an antecedent expression in the first. Obviously, this test is only 
applicable where there exists an anaphoric 3rd person pronoun in a non-initial unit 
retrieving a referent evoked in the initial one. If such a substitution is possible, 
preserving the anaphoric relation initially established, then we may be dealing (at the 
level of utterance processing) with an incrementation of the discourse model under 
construction, and therefore with an instance of macro-syntax —although in 
Berrendonner’s later work (Berrendonner et al. forthcoming), the possibility remains 
that other factors may still indicate that the two segments at issue are connected in terms 
of a micro-syntactic relation of some kind. While if this substitution is impossible, then 
other things being equal, the relation may be one of micro-syntax.                                                                                                                                    
A purely grammatically-determined (micro-syntactic) relation has none of the 
implications associated with macro-syntax: it simply indicates “what goes with what”, 
and “in what way”, at the level of grammatically-determined textualisation. It will be 
subject to the usual tests of dependency, all grammatical relations holding up to the 
level of the sentence.2 Beyond a given sentence, we enter the realm of inter-sentential 
relations, which is the province of discourse (and hence of “macro-syntax”). However, 
as we shall be seeing in due course, macro-syntactic relations may in fact hold within as 
well as outside the sentence boundary (cf. also Blanche-Benveniste 2002, 98, 112, 117).  
There is an evident (partial) parallel between Berrendonner’s notion “micro-
syntax” and that of text in my conception (see Table 1 below, as well as Cornish 2010, 
208-10), as also between his notion “macro-syntax” and my view of discourse (cf. 
Table 1). Micro-syntactic relations holding between syntactic units would form part of 
what I am calling text, which embraces the entire perceptible trace of an act of 
utterance. As such, this includes paralinguistic features of the utterance act, as well as 
non-verbal semiotically relevant signals such as gaze direction, pointing and other 
gestures, etc. But under the Fribourg conception, such non-verbal signals would fall 
within the set of means of expression (“actualisation”) of discourse, and would not form 
part of its notion of “micro-syntax”.  
Discourse in my approach refers to the structured, situated, revisable 
interpretation of utterances in conjunction with an appropriate context. Text provides the 
perceptible cues which, in conjunction with a relevant context, will enable the user to 
                                                
2 Berrendonner in fact does not recognize the traditional grammatical unit “sentence” as a relevant constituent within 
the “micro-”/“macro-syntax” distinction. The use in context of a complex sentence (which is what I have in mind in 
using the term here) would correspond to a “period” in the Fribourg conception. Blanche-Benveniste (2002, 102) in 
fact claims that the sentence is a “macro-syntactic”, not “micro-syntactic” unit, under her conception of the 
distinction.  
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construct discourse (see Cornish 2010 for further details).  
 
Table 1: The respective roles of text, context and discourse (Cornish 2010:Table 1, p.209, revised) 
 
Text Context Discourse 
The connected sequence of 
verbal signs and nonverbal 
signals in terms of which 
discourse is co-constructed 
by the discourse partners in 
the act of communication. 
 
The context (the domain of reference of a given 
text, the co-text, the discourse already 
constructed upstream, the genre of speech event 
in progress, the socio-cultural environment 
assumed by the text, the interactive relationships 
holding between the interlocutors at every point 
in the discourse, and the specific utterance 
situation at hand) is subject to a continuous 
process of construction and revision as the 
discourse unfolds. It is by invoking an 
appropriate context that the addressee or reader 
may create discourse on the basis of the 
connected sequence of textual cues that is text. 
The product of the hierarchical, 
situated sequence of utterance, 
indexical, propositional and 
illocutionary acts carried out in 
pursuit of some communicative 
goal, and integrated in a given 
context.  
 
Examples (1) and (2) below, taken from English “news-in-brief” newspaper 
articles, illustrate this distinction:  
 
(1) a. “US orders staff out of Uzbekistan 
The US and Israel have withdrawn [non-essential diplomatic staff and their familiesi]
3 
from Uzbekistan, after warnings that theyi could be targeted by Islamic militants. The 
move came after weeks of unrest in the wake of the massacre of hundreds of civilians in 
the town of Andijan last month.” (The Guardian Weekly, June 10-16, 2005, p. 2) 
 
     b. The US and Israel have withdrawn [non-essential diplomatic staff and their familiesi] 
from Uzbekistan, after warnings that the groupi could be targeted by Islamic 
militants… 
 
Replacing the 3rd person subject pronoun they in the modifying prepositional phrase 
introduced by after in (1a) by the definite NP the group, an NP capable of targeting the 
same referent, is (relatively) felicitous in (1b), in that the anaphoric link realised via the 
pronoun they in (1a) is maintained. And indeed, this PP is clearly only loosely 
connected, in grammatical terms, with the initial clause. Its function is that of a sentence 
adverbial, providing the reason for the state of affairs evoked via the initial (main) 
clause. We are therefore (by hypothesis) dealing with a macro-syntactic relation here. 
However, as Laure Anne Johnsen (p.c.) indicates, with the exception of the possibility 
of felicitous substitution of the pronoun by the definite NP here, the cues in this 
example point towards a micro-syntactic analysis —at least under the Fribourg 
conception. This is so, according to her, since the modifying PP is not autonomous 
morpho-syntactically, so could not constitute a “clause” in Berrendonner’s terms. But 
the fact remains that this modifying PP is only loosely connected with the main clause 
(the presence of the comma indicates this formally); and it is this which has enabled the 
NP’s substitution to be felicitous. The “macro-syntactic” status of sentential modifiers 
(so-called “compléments de phrase”) also corresponds to Blanche-Benveniste’s (2002, 
100) position.  So this factor would argue in favour of a more gradual, scalar conception 
                                                
3 In the following examples, square brackets have been inserted around textual antecedents and a subscripted letter 
placed before the closing square bracket, with the emboldened anaphoric expression marked with an identical 
subscript. This is in order to indicate the referential identity intended. 
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of the “micro-” vs. “macro-syntax” opposition, which I will indeed be arguing for 
below. Let us look now at example (2): 
 
(2) a.  “[Investors in the beleaguered oil firm Yukosj] have been told by a Russian court that 
theyj can have no role in the organisation’s bankruptcy. Analysts believe the state is 
attempting to renationalise the remains of the company.” The Guardian Weekly, 7-
13/04/06, p. 28. 
 
     b. #[Investors in the beleaguered oil firm Yukosj] have been told by a Russian court that 
the shareholdersj can have no role in the organisation’s bankruptcy... 
 
Contrary to what we have seen in (1), in (2b) it would not be possible to substitute an 
appropriate definite NP (the shareholders) for the subject pronoun they in the governed 
subordinate clause introduced by that, preserving the anaphoric relation with the matrix 
clause subject. It would seem, then, that the relationship between the initial predication 
and this subordinate clause is a micro-syntactic and not a macro-syntactic one. Another 
indication of this relationship is the impossibility of deleting the subordinate clause in 
(2a): *Investors in the beleaguered oil firm Yukos have been told by a Russian court. 
Compare this result with the naturalness of a deletion of the counterpart prepositional 
phrase in (1a): The US and Israel have withdrawn non-essential diplomatic staff and 
their families from Uzbekistan. After all, the subordinate clause in (2a), unlike the 
counterpart PP in (1a), realises a nuclear grammatical function — that of second object 
of the verb told (‘to tell someone something’), and is therefore a lexically governed unit.  
 It would seem then that the distinction between micro- vs. macro-syntactic 
relations involving textual or discourse units is a matter of degree rather than being an 
absolute, categorical one (which it clearly is under the Fribourg conception of the 
opposition, where a “macro-syntactic” relation between units can only hold between 
“clauses” representing actualised utterance acts). That is, it is in principle possible for a 
given textual unit to contract a (relatively) loose micro-syntactic relation with a 
controlling syntactic unit, but at the same time, as a potential unit of discourse, to enter 
into a discourse-pragmatic relation with some other such unit on the discourse plane. 
This “intermediate” position would be reflected by the possibility of the pronoun 
substitution test resulting in an indeterminate or unclear outcome —a situation which 
will be familiar to those working on indexical relations in discourse. As already 
indicated, this possibility is ruled out under the Fribourg conception of the “micro-” vs. 
“macro-syntax” distinction —though not by the Aix one (see Blanche-Benveniste 
2002).  
The distinction may have something to do with logophoric relations:4 where the 
relation between the proposition expressed by the subordinate clause and the matrix one 
is such that it represents the viewpoint of a matrix clause NP’s human referent (the 
“sujet de conscience”), then a lexical expression coreferential with it but which the 
intended referent would not have used in referring to himself, results in a bizarre 
reading. In my view, this is why a 3rd person pronoun would be expected, as 
maintaining logophorically the “sujet de conscience” from the matrix clause. Three 
examples from Chomsky (1986, 79-80) establish the point clearly (though Chomsky 
was concerned with a different issue in presenting them):  
                                                
4 ‘Logophoricity’ “refers to the phenomenon whereby the ‘perspective’ of an internal protagonist of a sentence or 
discourse, as opposed to that of the current, external speaker, is being reported by some morphological and/or 
syntactic means.” (Huang 2000, 172-3). 
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 (3) a.  Reagani was elected, although the former actori is regarded by many with a good deal of 
skepticism. (Chomsky’s 1986 ex. (48(i)), p. 79) 
        b. Reagani’s main problem is that the former actori is regarded by many with a good deal 
of skepticism. (Chomsky’s 1986 ex. (48(ii)), p. 80) 
        c. *Reagani is aware that the former actori is regarded by many with a good deal of 
skepticism. (Chomsky’s 1986 ex. (49), p. 80) 
 
In (3a) and (3b), the referent ‘Ronald Reagan’ is being viewed from the perspective of 
‘many (people)’, and so the lexical expression the former actor is an appropriate means 
of targeting this individual in the subordinate clause, maintaining that perspective; 
however, in (3c), the same lexical expression is infelicitous,5 as in the case of (2b) 
above with the alternative referent-maintaining NP the shareholders, since the content 
of the (here lexically governed) subordinate clause is being presented from the 
viewpoint of Reagan himself, as sujet de conscience of the entire discourse fragment. 
However, using a 3rd person pronoun (here he) in place of the definite indexical NP in 
(3c) would be perfectly coherent. So (2b) and (3c) would both be pragmatically 
infelicitous for the same kind of reason: in terms of discourse, they involve “crossed 
perspectival wires”, as it were — even though in direct discourse, the reporting 
expression the shareholders in (2b) would correspond to a 2nd person pronoun (you), 
whereas in (3c), it would correlate with a first-person one (I).  
 
3. Backgrounded vs. foregrounded discourse units 
 
Backgrounded vs. foregrounded units may be either micro-syntactic or macro-syntactic, 
in Berrendonner’s (1990), (2002) and Berrendonner et al.’s (forthcoming) terms. 
Syntactically, a given clause or phrase may be dependent with respect to a governing 
unit (lexeme, group, phrase or clause), and hence represent a backgrounded unit in 
purely formal, syntactic (textual) terms; but at the same time, in terms of discourse it 
may constitute foregrounded information in relation to the situation evoked via what 
may be analysed as its governing unit in syntactic terms. An attested oral example is 
given in (4):  
 
 (4) “He’s pushing forty, he’s developing a middle-aged spread, but Mohammed Ali has just 
made a bid for the heavyweight boxing championship of the world…” (Oral utterance, BBC 
Radio 4: Today programme) 
 
Here, the two initial clauses of this extract may be analysed as (paratactically 
connected) main clauses, syntactically, in relation to the following clause introduced by 
but: this clause may not occur independently of them, as a potentially main clause, 
initiating a discourse — though it may when uttered in a presuppositional context of the 
relevant kind. Yet in terms of discourse organisation, it is clear that the central 
information is conveyed by this clause, for which the two paratactic initial (potentially 
main) clauses act as anchoring context. The connective but is thus interpreted in this 
context as marking a concessive and not a purely oppositional relation between the two 
units: an appropriate paraphrase making explicit the discourse corresponding to this 
                                                
5 I would prefix the example with the crosshatch rather than the asterisk Chomsky uses to characterize its status. 
After all, there is nothing wrong with the well-formedness of (3c) qua sentence; rather, it is the discourse to which it 
will give rise by default which is problematic. 
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textual fragment might be as follows: “Although he may be pushing forty, and although 
he may be developing a middle-aged spread, Mohammed Ali has nevertheless just made 
a bid for the heavyweight boxing championship of the world”.  
 The intonation pattern corresponding to the two initial clauses as uttered involved 
a fall-rise (continuative) contour in each case, whereas the one with which the final 
clause was pronounced manifested a falling (conclusive) contour.6 It is a “denial of 
expectation” use of but: there is necessarily a pause (as here) between the preceding 
(paratactic) clause(s) and the clause prefixed by but; and there is no requirement that the 
two units connected thereby be of equal rank, syntactically (as would be the case for 
coordinator but — cf. Kies 1994).  
 Notice also how the presence of 3rd person pronoun (hence referentially highly 
dependent) subjects in the two initial main clauses, linked paratactically, reflects the 
discursively subordinate, background status of these units, in relation to the following 
clause introduced by the connective (cf. also Mittwoch 1983, 134). Likewise, the 
presence of a full proper name, Mohammed Ali (a referentially-autonomous expression) 
in subject position, reflects the discursively foreground status of this unit. In terms of 
the micro- vs. macro-syntax distinction, I would argue that we have to do with three 
macro-syntactic units here (this would also be the Fribourg School position, as Laure 
Anne Johnsen (p.c.) points out) since at least the subject pronoun in the first of the two 
initial clauses may coherently be replaced by a definite lexical NP (e.g. the man), 
preserving the coreferential-anaphoric relation with the “antecedent” NP Mohammed Ali 
in the third.7  Moreover, none of the clauses at issue is connected with the other(s) as a 
grammatically governed unit.   
 In example (1a) above, the adverbial PP introduced by after is both (loosely) 
dependent — hence backgrounded — syntactically and subsidiary (i.e. also 
backgrounded) informationally, in that it serves to motivate the central situation evoked 
via the initial main clause. Conversely, in (2a), although the subordinate clause 
introduced by that is highly dependent (being a lexically governed unit, hence 
syntactically backgrounded), in terms of the organisation of the message corresponding 
to this text fragment as a whole, it conveys the key information. So it is a foreground, 
not a background unit in discourse terms. This distinction can be brought out using 
Erteschik-Shir’s (2007, 39, 164) so-called “lie test”: if it is felicitous to contradict a 
given phrase or clause within an utterance, then that phrase or clause is asserted 
(conveys focal information in context) and is not presupposed. However, if the 
contradiction is infelicitous, then it will correspond to backgrounded and not to 
foregrounded information. The test should be construed in relative, not absolute terms: 
the relative degree of ease with which the contradiction may be realised reflects the 
degree of “foregroundedness” of the information unit at issue. See the very similar test 
used by Boye and Harder (2009, 21) in terms of what the authors call “addressability” 
as applied to their Danish examples (16) and (17). Let us apply the “lie” test to the 
subordinate clause in (2a):  
 
(2) a.´ A to B: Investors in the beleaguered oil firm Yukos have been told by a Russian court 
that they can have no role in the organisation’s bankruptcy. 
                                                
6 Cf. Mittwoch’s (1983, 134) observation concerning the backwards-anaphora compound sentences whose conjuncts 
are connected by but which she presents in her article. 
7 See Mittwoch (1983) for further examples and discussion of the kinds of discourse motivations behind the use of 
backwards anaphora where the anaphor(s) occur(s) in a non-dependent clause preceding its/their textual antecedent. 
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  B: But that’s not true: they CAN (‘have such a role’)! 
 
The result is positive, showing that the subordinate clause represents asserted,8 thus 
focused (i.e. foregrounded) and not presupposed, backgrounded information. The same 
test would yield a positive result when applied to (4), as shown by (4a):  
 
(4) a.  A to B: He’s pushing forty, he’s developing a middle-aged spread, but Mohammed Ali 
has just made a bid for the heavyweight boxing championship of the world. 
B: That’s not true! He HASn’t (‘just made a bid for the heavyweight boxing 
championship of the world’)! 
 
B’s contradiction here relates to the claim made in the foregrounded part of (4) (what is 
conveyed by the but clause).  
 Compare this with the relatively strained objection relating only to what is 
conveyed by the paratactically connected main clauses. See (4a´):  
 
(4) a.´  A to B: He’s pushing forty, he’s developing a middle-aged spread, but Mohammed Ali 
has just  made a bid for the heavyweight boxing championship of the world. 
   B: ?# That’s not true! He ISn’t (‘pushing forty and developing a middle-aged spread’)! 
 
Philippe de Brabanter (p.c.) points out that the reason why B’s retort is infelicitous here 
may have to do with distance: by the time B speaks, it is possible that ‘pushing forty 
and developing a middle-aged spread’ is no longer topical and cannot, therefore, be 
easily targeted by a denial. This is no doubt true, but this would only heighten its 
relatively backgrounded status at this point in the discourse. The concessive value in 
context of the conjunction but and the continuative-conclusive intonation structure 
clearly show, independently, that the first two clauses convey background, and the last, 
foreground information here.  
 The contrasting results yielded by this test show, then, that the syntactically main 
clauses in (4) express background rather than foreground information, the 
contradiction via negation proving more difficult than the parallel contradiction of the 
syntactically coordinate (i.e. non-independent) clause introduced by the connective, as 
in (4a) above.  
 As suggested in section 2 in relation to the micro- vs. macro-syntax relationship, 
the foreground-background distinction in discourse also admits of degrees, and is not a 
categorical one (cf. also Givón 1987; Khalil 2005). Khalil suggests that it may operate 
in different ways at different levels, in fact. See Table 2 below:  
 
                                                
8 Philippe de Brabanter (p.c.) points out that the complement clause cannot be said to be “asserted” by the speaker of  
(2a), since s/he is not necessarily committed to its truth. However, this is in fact an instance of indirect reported 
speech; as such, it is clear that from the point of view of the ‘Russian court’ (the primary locutionary source for the 
reported speech segment), the complement clause proposition is indeed asserted in the sense that its primary 
locutionary source is committing itself to the truth of the proposition asserted. So in fact the Guardian journalist here 
is simply reporting an earlier assertion corresponding to the content of the complement clause. De Brabanter also 
notes that in the case of (4a), the speaker (A) is clearly committing himself to the proposition expressed by the but-
clause, and hence this may be taken to be asserted. But notice also that in (4a), unlike (2a), there is only a single 
locutionary source involved, namely the actual speaker (in (4), the radio journalist). 
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Table 2. Levels of grounding according to Khalil (2005) (Table 1 “Notions used in this study”, Khalil, 
2005,3) 
  
Notion Domain Description 
Figure-Ground visual perception 
cognition 
Objects are perceptually organized 
relative to each other.  
Grounding (foreground-background) 
structure 
text semantics 
 
The organization of semantic 
representations or the propositional 
content in terms of a grounding scale, 
distinguishing various grounding 
values.  
Information structure cognition One way in which knowledge is 
(hierarchically) organized in models.  
It is textually constructed in semantic 
representations, that is, meaning and 
its organization in text.  
Prominence text strategy 
 
Surface structure organization. The 
relative conspicuousness of sentences 
and their constituents as a result of 
their linear organization.  
Foregrounding & backgrounding text pragmatics Surface structure operations that 
make sentences and their constituents 
more or less prominent and influence 
the interpretation of text meaning in 
terms of grounding values that have 
already been assigned to propositions.  
 
As can be seen, Khalil draws a five-way distinction amongst “figure-ground”, which 
has to do with perception and the resulting cognition; “grounding (foreground-
background) structure”, which relates to text semantics (“the organization of semantic 
representations or the propositional content in terms of a grounding scale, 
distinguishing various grounding values”); information structure, which concerns how 
meaning is organised in texts; “prominence”, determined by a given text strategy, 
defined as “…the relative conspicuousness of sentences and their constituents as a result 
of their linear organization” (p. 3); and finally, “foregrounding and backgrounding”, 
which are bound up with text pragmatics.9 These are said to be “surface structure 
operations that make sentences and their constituents more or less prominent and 
influence the interpretation of text meaning in terms of grounding values that have 
already been assigned to propositions.” The key point that seems to be at issue here is 
the fact that users are not “condemned” to organise their utterances in terms of the 
perceived “figure-ground” structure of the situation which they wish to verbalize; but 
that what they choose to foreground and/or to background in their message is a function 
of their communicative intentions.  
 The possible default grounding values are foreground, midground and 
background. As argued above, Khalil (2005, 4) observes that syntactic organisation 
does not of itself assign grounding values (e.g. syntactically non-independent clauses, as 
in (2b) and (4) above, do not always convey subsidiary, background information; and 
                                                
9 The distinctions between “prominence”, “information structure” and “foregrounding” and “backgrounding” are not 
fully clear, however — unless it is intended that part or all of an utterance becomes prominent and foregrounded (or 
non-prominent and backgrounded) as a result of the imposition of a given information structure upon it. In any case, 
we may wonder why the notion “prominence” is needed alongside “information structure”, and “foregrounding” and 
“backgrounding”. After all, if a speaker chooses to “foreground” a discourse unit, then it will of necessity be 
“prominent” in terms of surface structure (i.e. lexico-grammatical realisation); while if s/he elects to “background” it, 
then it will evidently not be prominent, surface-structurally. 
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syntactically main clauses, as in (4), do not always express foreground information). 
Grounding values are genre-specific: for example, in written news articles, the value 
“foreground” tends to be assigned to macro-propositions. These denote the key event or 
situation which the article as a whole develops. The value “background” will tend to be 
assigned to propositions expressing circumstantial information (the spatio-temporal 
setting of the main event or situation). This is what “grounds” or anchors the central 
information derived from the text and a suitable context. See de Vega et al. (2007) for 
experimental evidence in favour of the background status of preposed temporal clauses 
in German and Spanish introduced by the equivalents of while. See also Auer (2009, 86) 
who quotes from Duranti and Goodwin (1992, 10ff) in stating that “‘focal events’ as 
figures are perceived as “well outlined, sharply defined and well articulated”, while 
contexts as grounds “appear far more amorphous, problematic, and less stable””. 
Finally, the value “midground” may be attributed to propositions that elaborate or 
explain the main event. 
 In terms of prominence, which is a surface-structural property of texts, the point is 
made that what is made prominent textually may not be foreground meaning, but may 
enjoy a relatively lower grounding value: “…prominence and importance are 
independent of each other” (Khalil 2005, 6). Khalil (p. 7) goes on to write of “figure and 
ground slots” in text structure, which may be filled by clauses expressing background, 
midground or foreground propositions. Foregrounding and backgrounding are 
pragmatic operations with surface-structural implications, whereas foreground and 
background are characteristics of the semantic structure of the clauses concerned 
(Khalil 2005, 11).  
 In the examples discussed so far, the background or foreground units at issue have 
mostly been clauses. However, when longer texts are taken into account, it is clear that 
each status may characterize much larger segments of text. In narrative texts, for 
example (see Jadir 2005, 238-257), the foreground sequences of actions being recounted 
may be interrupted by background descriptions (of a scene or a character), or by a 
flashback or a series of flashbacks to an earlier situation in which the character(s) 
concerned may have been involved (see examples (10) and (11) below for illustration). 
These interruptions often serve to explain the motivations of the characters involved at 
the point of interruption. Whereas the time-line of the central narration will be realised 
by simple past (preterit) or (historic) present tenses carried by the finite verbs 
involved,10  the interrupting descriptive or explanatory sequences will tend to be realised 
as far as tense is concerned by the past perfect (French plus-que-parfait), the simple 
present tense or the present or past progressive (imparfait in French). The corresponding 
French devices are invoked here for purposes of comparison. The last-mentioned types 
of tense/aspect (apart from the past perfect/plus-que-parfait) have as a common feature 
the expression of an imperfective aspect (see also Khalil 2005, 3). However, where the 
shift to an earlier state of affairs is explicitly marked (e.g. via a temporal adverbial), the 
tense of the finite verbs in a background unit may still be the simple past, a tense type 
also typically used for the main time-line development in the foreground narrative 
units.11  
                                                
10
 Prototypically by the passé simple, in French. However, I do not wish to imply that this tense, or indeed the other 
French tenses mentioned in the text above and below, function in exactly parallel fashion with respect to their English 
counterparts. 
11 See also Hopper (1979), Reinhart (1984), Dowty (1986), Gennari (2004) and Madden and Zwaan (2003) on this 
issue. 
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4. Discourse anaphora, ‘strict’ anadeixis and discourse deixis 
 
In my view (see Cornish 1999, 2010), deixis and discourse anaphora are complementary 
discourse-referring procedures which the user exploits in constructing, modifying and 
accessing the contents of mental models of an unfolding discourse represented in the 
minds of speaker and addressee (or writer and reader in the written form of language). 
Basically, deixis and anaphora are procedures for coordinating the speech participants’ 
attention throughout the flow of text as produced within a given context to which they 
are both party (see in particular Clark and Bangerter 2004 on this issue, in terms of the 
act of referring more generally).  
Both discourse anaphora and deixis, then, operate at the level of memory 
organization, enabling the speaker to manage it by guiding the addressee’s processing of 
the incoming segments of a text (cf. also Ehlich 1982, 325, 330). Deixis under this view 
involves the use of the speech situation (the (deictic) ground, in Hanks’                                  
1992 terminology) to profile a figure (a new referent or a new conception of an existing 
referent within the discourse registry). A canonical example is given in (5):  
 
(5)   Hey, look at that!  [The speaker gestures towards a strange-looking bird 
perched on a branch of a nearby tree] 
 
Here, the existence of the intended referent (‘the strange-looking bird on the tree 
close to the interlocutors’), which is available within the utterance context, is being 
drawn to the addressee’s attention as a function of the very act of utterance involved. It 
is not presupposed already to exist and to be salient within the latter’s attention focus, 
as is the case with canonical anaphoric references. Rather, its existence is asserted (or, 
more accurately, demonstrated). The distal demonstrative that (and not proximal this) 
is used here, since the speaker’s intention is evidently to secure a joint orientation of the 
interlocutors’ attention focus on the intended referent. The deictic procedure adopted 
results in the intended referent “standing out” from within its context, thereby acquiring 
a high level of psychological salience for both speaker and addressee; so it is introduced 
into the discourse as a new unit of information.  
By contrast, anaphora consists in the retrieval via a referentially-dependent 
indexical expression token from within a given ground of an already existing ‘figure’ 
(or one which may be relatively easily accommodated or otherwise inferred from 
context), together with its ‘ground’, the anaphoric predication acting to extend that 
ground (see Kleiber 1994, Ch. 3) — i.e. to carry it over for the interpretation of the 
current utterance. The occurrence of an anaphor together with the clause in which it 
occurs as a whole constitutes a signal to continue the focus of attention established —or 
assumed to be established— at the point of use. For a canonical example of anaphora, 
see the occurrence of it in the possible continuation of the utterance in (5): 
 
(5) a. …I wonder how it got there. 
 
The occurrence of it in (5a) presupposes that its intended referent is already known to 
the addressee and is indeed uppermost in his/her mind at the time of utterance. That is, 
it is already highly salient psychologically, and so requires only minimal coding. 
Examples (1), (2), (3a,b) and (4) above provide further illustrations. The 
“figure/ground” relation is thus an integral part of the operation of these two indexical 
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referring procedures. See also Sidnell (2009,118) for this conception as regards the 
operation of deixis in discourse. See Cornish (2010, 218-223) for further discussion of 
the deixis/discourse anaphora distinction.  
 Pure deixis is canonically realised by the use of 1st and 2nd person pronouns. 
These are “token-reflexive” in that their very use in context automatically yields their 
referent (current speaker and current addressee, respectively —or referents that include 
current speaker and addressee). As such, a token of one of these form types cannot be 
used anaphorically. At the other extreme are 3rd person reflexive pronouns, whose 
referent is determined quasi-automatically in terms of semantic-syntactic factors within 
the host clause as a bound anaphor. A token of this form type (when unstressed in 
English) cannot be used deictically.  
Yet the relationship between deixis and anaphora is asymmetrical: these are by no 
means “absolute” or autonomous indexical referring procedures. As Lyons (1975) 
convincingly argued (cf. also Bühler 1990/1934, Gerner 2009 and others), anaphora is 
derivative upon deixis, on which it depends. Deixis is the more fundamental referring 
procedure. The majority of indexical expression types capable of realising anaphora 
may also have a deictic function (or are morphologically derived from those that are 
specialised in this use). The real relationship between these two indexical procedures 
may be characterised in terms of a cline, with a medium term: this intermediate, hybrid 
level has been termed “anadeixis” by Ehlich (1982). See Figure 1 in Cornish (2010 
221).   
Thus in between the two polar types of indexicals (1st and 2nd person pronouns, 
and 3rd person reflexive pronouns) we find a range of expression types — mainly 
demonstrative-based — which may be called “anadeictic”: see Ehlich (1982, 333-4). 
The use of one of these expression types involves partly anaphoric, and partly deictic 
reference. It exploits the basic (i.e. “situational”) deictic procedure as applied to the 
discourse already constructed (or shortly to be constructed) — hence also the 
“anaphoric” dimension of this usage. See example (6) for an attested (written) 
illustration of what I am calling ‘strict’ anadeixis:  
 
(6) “…‘We use Viking as a shorthand term and there’s the traditional raping and pillaging 
image of the Vikings. That was replaced in the 1970s by what I think of as the fluffy 
bunny school of Viking studies…’”. (Extract from article by Mark Brown “‘Stunning’ 
Viking find of silver coins and jewellery bought for the nation”, The Guardian 
28.08.09, p. 12). (Example (9) in Cornish 2011) 
 
In (6), the referent of the (‘strict’) anadeictic demonstrative pronoun that is introduced 
in the initial sentence of the extract via a predicative phrase (‘there’s [the traditional 
raping and pillaging image of the Vikings]’) — what’s more, in focus position within 
an existential construction. The demonstrative could not be replaced completely 
felicitously via a simple pronoun (it here: ?It was replaced in the 1970s by…). This is 
because it is not yet installed as a topic in the reader’s mental model of the discourse 
being constructed (the host sentence constitutes a ‘thetic, “all-new information” 
judgement’), and needs a stronger indexical reference in order to achieve this 
successfully: the distal demonstrative pronoun fits the bill admirably here. Note also the 
distancing effect of the use of that, in referring to the earlier image in question which 
has been replaced by the more recent one. 
A second sub-type of anadeixis is so-called “recognitional” anadexis, whereby an 
expanded distal demonstrative expression or an expanded definite NP is used to locate 
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an item of shared knowledge from within the addressee’s long-term memory, and raise 
it to consciousness (as in Do you remember that time we got rained out camping in 
Spain?). See Cornish (2011, 758-9) for further discussion.  
The third sub-type of anadeixis, discourse deixis, involves contextual pointing to 
a part of the recently constructed discourse representation, and building it into a 
discourse entity which may subsequently be retrieved via an anaphor.12 In this type of 
contextual reference, the reader or addressee must create a referent from within the 
immediate discourse context.13 Clearly, it is demonstrative expressions which are 
specialised in this function. (See as illustration examples (7)-(9) below, and for further 
discussion, Cornish 2011, 759-60). The demonstrative, guided by the predicative 
component of the indexical clause as a whole, “points” to the relevant part of the 
context representation; and the process of understanding it actually creates a referent out 
of that representation. Unlike Piwek et al. (2008, 697), I do not believe it is just a form 
of “anaphora”, simply because its function is to relate to prior (or subsequent) discourse. 
For unlike anaphora (or indeed, “‘strict’ anadeixis”), with discourse deixis there is no 
independently existing discourse entity upstream “waiting” for its reference to be picked 
up by a discourse-deictically used expression. Diessel (1999,101) claims that the 
referent of such demonstratives “has no existence outside of the universe of discourse in 
the physical world.” Another distinctive property of this use, again according to Diessel, 
is the fact that the referent thereby established tends not to persist in the subsequent 
discourse.  
Figure 1 below presents the various indexical referring procedures mentioned so 
far, in terms of a scale of indexical referring possibilities ranging from canonical deixis 
to canonical discourse anaphora at each pole. The “anadeictic” span on this Scale ranges 
from “discourse deixis”, towards the pure deictic pole, through “recognitional” 
anadeixis, to “‘strict’ anadeixis”, near the pure anaphora one.  
 
canonical deixis  >  discourse deixis  >  recognitional anadeixis  > ‘strict’ anadeixis  
>  canonical discourse anaphora 
 
Figure 1: Scale of indexical referring procedures (Fig. 2 in Cornish, 2011: 760) 
 
Examples (7) through (9) below involve a demonstrative NP or pronoun within a 
pragmatically foregrounded unit targeting the result of processing a text segment that 
forms part of a pragmatically backgrounded unit: namely, a restrictive relative clause in 
(7), conveying presupposed information, a presupposition associated with an indefinite 
NP in (8), and an inference (“writing a musical inevitably takes a considerable amount 
of time”) in (9). 
To illustrate the distinction between discourse anaphora and discourse deixis, the 
occurrence of the demonstrative NP those boring Sundays in example (7) (line 3) is 
particularly interesting: 
 
(7)  “There’s a word for people who keep obsessive records about how often they’ve mowed 
                                                
12 See Diessel (1999, 100-105), (2006, 475-6) and what Lyons (1977, 668) calls “impure textual deixis”. 
13 Diessel (1999, 93) characterizes discourse deixis achieved via demonstratives as “refer[ence] to propositions; they 
link the clause in which they are embedded to the proposition to which they refer.” However, as those boring Sundays 
in (7) and that amount of time in (9) below, in particular, attest, discourse deixis via demonstratives is by no means 
limited to reference to propositions. 
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their lawn in the past 25 years. But one listener to last year’s The First Cuckoo and the Last 
Swallow on Radio 4 counted those boring Sundays and has now proved to be one of the 
many extremely important contributors to a nationwide nature diary….” (“Return of the 
First Cuckoo” (3.45pm R4), Radio Times 5-11.08.06, p. 132) 
 
This is an example of discourse deixis in that it requires the reader to construct out of 
the discourse context an entity such that the people who “keep obsessive records about 
how often they have mowed the lawn in the past 25 years” do so once a week “on 
Sundays” (i.e. at the end of any given week), and that the obsessive recording of the fact 
is a boring, routine activity. These two concepts (“boring” and “Sundays”) are 
implicitly predicated within the distal demonstrative NP, so this is consistent with the 
contribution of new, but context-related information that is associated with the 
(ana)deictic use of demonstratives.  Discourse deixis is the sub-type of anadeixis that is 
closest to pure (canonical) deixis (see Fig. 1 above).  Notice how the referent of those 
boring Sundays is constructed from within an informationally subsidiary textual 
segment (the restrictive relative clause who…years in lines 1-2 of the example) which is 
clearly in a micro-syntactic relation with regard to its containing NP.  
The content of this relative clause corresponds to presupposed and not asserted 
information, and as such is backgrounded in terms of its discourse status. It is 
presupposed since the whole point of the NP is to evoke a stereotypical type of person 
— the stereotype being conveyed via the relative clause. As such, the writer assumes 
that there are such people, and that the reader will readily recognize their existence. Not 
only would Erteschik-Shir’s (2007) “lie-test” yield a negative result when it is 
attempted to contradict the content of the restrictive relative clause (see section 3 
above), but the “reporting” test using the reporting verb tell (cf. Griffiths 2006, 147) 
would also be negative here.14 As in (4), the second sentence prefaced by the 
conjunction but (here assuming a quasi-adverbial function: see Kies 1994) will convey 
the most prominent (foregrounded) information, the initial sentence as a whole then 
being construed as background, grounding the main information to come. The two 
sentences obviously contract a macro-syntactic relation with one another, in 
Berrendonner et al.’s (forthcoming) terms.  
Let us look now at a further attested, but spoken, example involving a 
contrastively-accented demonstrative (see Chapman 1998 on the interpretative effects of 
accenting in English).  
 
   (8)  a. [Interview with Jonathan Porritt, then leader of the environmental pressure group 
Friends of the Earth, by Nicholas Witchell, BBC Radio 5, 16 October, 1994] 
NW:  do you think that he [‘Prince Charles’] will become a GREEN monarch? 
JP:  well, yes, but I don’t think that everyone necessarily subscribes to THAT.  
                    L+H*L-L%15 
                                                
14 Compare (i) and (i)´ below:  
 
(i) A: “There’s a word for people who keep obsessive records about how often they’ve mowed their 
lawn in the past 25 years…”. 
B, reporting this to C: ? “A told me that people keep obsessive records about how often they’ve 
mowed their lawns in the past 25 years…”. 
(i)´ [Same context as (i)] B to C: “A told me that there’s a word for people who keep obsessive 
records about how often they’ve mowed their lawn in the past 25 years…”. 
15 I use Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg’s (1990) notation system for intonation here, as follows: ‘L’ = ‘low pitch 
syllable’, ‘H’ = ‘high pitch syllable’; ‘*’= ‘accented syllable’; ‘%’ = ‘intonation phrase boundary syllable’ ‘-’ = 
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 NW:  -- what, that he will ever one day beCOME king? 
JP:     yes.    (Example (2.8a) in Cornish 1999:30). 
 
            b.  ...JP: #…well, yes, but I don’t think that everyone necessarily subSCRIBes to it. 
                           H*L      
     
          c.  Presupposition structure of the complement clause in line 1 in (8a): “that Prince Charles 
[will] become an X monarch” 
 
Questioned predicate:  “X = “environmentally-conscious”?” 
 
Effect on this presupposition structure created by the interpretation of THAT within its 
predicational context:  “that Prince Charles [will] become monarch” 
 
In (8a), what is highlighted in the context constituted by the interviewer’s initial 
question, given the global topic at issue, is Prince Charles’ ecological credentials, not 
whether in fact he would ever become king one day – a proposition which is 
presupposed by this speaker: the pre-nominal adjective GREEN was accented and 
pronounced with high pitch, while the head noun monarch was unaccented and carried a 
low level of pitch. The interviewee, however, though replying affirmatively to the 
question posed (Well, yes…), sought to call its presupposition into question; and he did 
this in part by using a strongly accented distal demonstrative pronoun (THAT) fulfilling 
a discourse-deictic function, in order to make accessible and salient an item of 
information which, in the context set up by the interpretation of the initial question, was 
in the background, not the foreground, of attention: the source of the referent evoked via 
construal of THAT is the governed clausal complement of think in the interviewer’s first 
question. This is again in a micro-syntactic relation with the matrix clause; but the 
clause introduced by but in the interviewee’s turn evidently contracts a macro-syntactic 
relation with the complement clause in the interviewer’s first turn. I have attempted to 
formulate the information-structure representation of this segment of discourse under 
(8c).  
In neither of the examples presented above could the retrieval have been effected 
felicitously via the use of a potentially anaphoric expression (for example, a reduced 
definite NP or a 3rd person pronoun: #the boring Sundays or #them in (7) and ?#the 
idea/the possibility or #it in (8a): see (8b)). Such indexical-expression types are 
specialised in the expression of anaphora, where the referent retrieved is assumed to be 
salient for the addressee/reader to some degree — the anaphoric segment simply 
carrying over the situation evoked in the antecedent unit. Such units are normally 
retrieved from the forefront of the discourse, the backgrounded segments serving to 
support or “anchor” them in some way.  
Let us look now at example (9).  
 
(9)  “I’ve written 14 musicals and don’t have a huge desire to write another until I’m absolutely 
sure I want to invest that amount of time...”. (“Staging a revival”, RT Interview with 
Andrew Lloyd-Webber, Radio Times 5-11/08/06, p. 18) 
 
In (9), the time taken to write a musical is not in focus or even accessible when the 
predication I’ve written 14 musicals is realised. It is the result of an inference drawn at 
the point of interpretation of the indexical. Hence the use of a distal demonstrative NP 
                                                
‘intermediate phrase boundary symbol. See Beckman and Elam (1997), Beckman et al. (2005) and Watson et al. 
(2008) for further details of this ‘phonological’ approach to intonation. 
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that amount of time to refer to this aspect of the writing of a musical. The demonstrative 
pronoun #that or the equivalent definite lexical NP (#the amount of time) would not 
have been equal to the referential task required here. Again, as in the earlier examples 
we have seen (in spite of the fact that the exponent demonstrative NP occurs within a 
syntactically subordinate clause), the indexical reference occurs within a foregrounded 
segment, discursively, in relation to a referent derived from within a relatively 
backgrounded one, the two units arguably contracting a “macro-syntactic” relation with 
each other: we may analyse the initial “antecedent” clause as representing a 
backgrounded item of information in relation to the main, foregrounded content 
associated with the second conjunct (an explicit paraphrase would be “although I’ve 
written 14 musicals, I don’t have a huge desire to write another until I’m absolutely sure 
I want to invest that amount of time”). The intonation contours associated with each 
conjunct would be continuative rather than conclusive (only the conditional subordinate 
clause until…time would be conclusive). See Brazil’s (1997, Ch. 4) pragmatically-
relevant distinction between two types of intonation contour in English: the so-called 
“referring tone” (fall-rise) and “proclaiming tone” (fall). Correspondingly, Erteschik-
Shir’s (2007) “lie-test” would be negative for each of the main clause conjuncts, but 
positive for the conditional clause introduced by until. See also examples (4) and (8) 
above.  
Table 3 below summarises the distinction between the ‘strict’ anadeictic and 
discourse-deictic uses of demonstrative expressions.  
 
Table 3: “Anadeictic” uses of demonstratives in English (revised version of Table 1 in Cornish, 
2007:162) 
 
Parameters ‘Strict’ anadeictic use Discourse-deictic use 
Referent is a determinate entity 
already bearing a minimal level of 
saliency 
 
+ 
 
- 
Requires understander to operate on 
immediate discourse context, in order 
to construct a new discourse entity 
 
- 
 
 
+ 
Possible introduction by a variety of 
syntactic types of antecedent-trigger 
 
- 
 
+ 
Indexical expression can be replaced 
by a definite NP where denotation of 
NP’s lexical component is 
presupposed 
 
+ 
 
- 
Indexical expression substitutable by 
an unaccented 3rd person pronoun 
   
 +? 
 
- 
Referent likely to persist in 
subsequent discourse (pace Diessel 
1999) 
 
+ 
 
- 
Referent has no existence outside the 
discourse, in “real” world (pace 
Diessel 1999) 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
Sections 5 and 6 will try to identify the principles and constraints which relate 
discourse-anaphoric retrieval to referents associated with foregrounded discourse units, 
and ‘strict’ anadeictic and discourse-deictic reference with ones to be constructed from 
backgrounded or midgrounded units (the latter sub-type is not illustrated here, 
however). In particular, they will aim to determine the limits of anaphoric reference 
within the latter types of segments. 
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5. Discourse anaphora, ‘strict’ anadeixis and foregrounded vs. backgrounded 
discourse units 
  
Here now are two longer attested extracts (the first oral, the second written) where a 
subsequent reference to an already-introduced referent pops over a backgrounded 
segment to return to the “interrupted”, main-line part of the discourse. But this is not 
done in the same way in each case.  
Example (10) is an extract from an eye-witness account of the tsunami wave 
disaster as it affected the coast of Thailand in December 2004:  
 
 (10) (…) I noticed small kids and tourists walking to where the water had receded, curious 
as to why the water had gone. 
         Then I saw it - I noticed people craning their necks and looking out on the 
horizon. You could see a wall of water about three or four stories (sic) high. I felt like I 
was watching a movie, it was completely surreal. 
        It wasn't moving very quickly, it took between four and five minutes until I saw it 
hit and in that time slowly people started to realise what was happening. People were 
saying ‘Oh God, what is that?’ I thought I was dreaming. 
 After a few seconds the wave hit ø and ø smashed against the beach. (…) 
(Extract from “Eyewitness: Panic in Patong”, BBC News on the Web, 27.12.04) 
 
In this extract from an originally oral monologue, it is a lexical NP (the wave) and not a 
pronoun (it), which is used in line 9 to refer to the tsunami wave, introduced (in part at 
least) in the main-line part of the narrative preceding the brief background segment in 
lines 7 and 8. This is not due to the lack of salience in context of the intended referent 
(which is indeed the macro-topic-to-be at this point in the discourse). It is due in part to 
a purely discourse-structural factor: the fact that the introduction of ‘the tsunami wave’ 
by the narrator in lines 3-6 has been interrupted by his reference to the incredulous 
reactions of the people around him at the time (People were saying ‘Oh God, what is 
THAT?’). This is a direct-speech report, which as such momentarily shifts the 
locutionary source —as well as of the point of view being expressed. See also the 
interrupting segment in example (11) (lines 2-5) below. Note furthermore the tense 
difference here (preterit for the reporting segment and simple present for the reported 
speech segment).  So in returning to the main line of narration of the sequence of events 
after it, there is a need to “reset the cursor” to what is to be the macro-topic and the 
narration of its development.  
Notice also that the tsunami wave has not yet been characterised as a ‘wave’: for 
the narrator uses a (mixed) metaphor in describing it in line 4 (“a wall of water about 
three or four storeys high” — my emphasis). This need to reset the cursor is further 
strengthened by the fact that the direct-speech quotation just given in line 8 has stressed 
the difficulty the bystanders faced at the time in characterizing (categorizing, more 
properly) what they were witnessing: this is highlighted precisely by their use of the 
stressed distal demonstrative pronoun THAT (as also used in (8a)) within an 
interrogative construction. In discourse terms, this reference will not yet have been 
ratified by the hearer or reader at this point in the text (or so the narrator assumes) – a 
state of affairs which calls for a lexically explicit, characterising expression type rather 
than a purely pronominal reference in line 9.  
 In (11) below, by contrast, a possessive pronominal determiner and 3rd person 
pronoun are used following a segment which is arguably “background” (a direct speech 
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quotation from the subject of an interview, interrupting the 3rd person report by the 
journalist, and illustrating the point just made prior to it), connecting up with the 
foreground segment preceding it. Consider the interpretation of the pronouns in the last 
sentence of the following extract: 
 
(11) “...He [Kenny Rogers] grew up with four brothers and three sisters, the son of a labourer 
and a cleaning lady, in a poor area of Houston, Texas. “My father was an alcoholic, but it 
wasn’t disruptive because he was a wonderful man with a great sense of humour. The worst 
he did for our family was use money for alcohol rather than food or clothes.  But he earned 
it, and had the right to get something out of life. He didn’t drink for the last four years.” 
His parents were not keen on him being a musician, and the early years were tough...”   
(Interview with Kenny Rogers, The Radio Times, 7-13.8.99, p. 18; example (17) in Cornish, 
2002). 
 
Observe, first, that there are two discourse segments16 in this extract: an “outer” or 
containing segment where it is the journalist who conducted the interview who is the 
locutionary source, and an inner, embedded segment corresponding to the direct speech 
section, where it is the interviewee, Kenny Rogers, who takes on the role of locutionary 
source. So this example is similar in this respect to example (10) above. The direct-
speech segment is explicitly delimited graphically via the opening and closing of the 
inverted commas, and via the switch from third-person to first-person pronouns in 
reference to the interviewee. But there are no differences as far as tense/aspect is 
concerned (unlike in example (10)). Note also that the local discourse topics of each 
segment are distinct: for the main discourse segment, this is ‘Kenny Rogers’, whereas 
for the embedded discourse segment, it is ‘Kenny Rogers’ father’. The direct speech 
segment is clearly background in relation to the feature article as a whole, since the 
latter is about Kenny Rogers, not his father. Direct-speech quotations are a favourite 
device used by journalists to create a sense of vividness in their reports, and to provide 
direct evidence for the more general points they may be making.   
Once the direct-speech segment is terminated, it is “popped” from the highest 
position in the “focus stack” (according to Grosz and Sidner’s 1986 hierarchy of “focus 
spaces” associated with given discourse segments), and its contents are therefore no 
longer available for anaphors (here the possessive determiner his and the third-person 
pronoun him in the final sentence) to pick up. And this corresponds to intuition, since 
these two anaphors are unambiguous in referring to Kenny Rogers, rather than to Kenny 
Rogers’ father, the topic of the intervening direct-speech segment. These anaphors, in 
conjunction with the content of their host predicator and the closing of the inverted 
commas at the end of the immediately preceding sentence, effect a “return pop” to the 
main, interrupted segment, which is about Kenny Rogers himself — even though they 
are in this instance 3rd person pronominal and not lexical anaphors, unlike the situation 
in (10). The reason is that the popped-over segment is felt as an interruption, whereby 
the popped-back-to segment is continued by the popping segment. It is thus still in an 
active state, in terms of discourse attention focus. Unlike example (10), the popped-
back-to referent is already firmly installed in the addressee’s mind at the point of return 
(and categorised as an entity of a particular type), and is no longer under construction.  
(10) and (11) both involved “popping” references after a background segment to 
                                                
16 That is, basic discourse units, defined in part by their implementing a particular discourse purpose or goal relative 
to some more global discourse purpose: see Grosz and Sidner (1986) for both the term discourse segment and its 
definition and illustration. 
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the foreground segment which “embeds” it, hierarchically. In (12) and (13) below, on 
the other hand, we have a (strict) anadeictic reference in (12) and an attempted 
anaphoric one in (13) to a referent previously evoked within a highly backgrounded 
segment, micro-syntactically connected to its governing one.  
 
(12)   “Asia 
  Pakistan quake toll tops 73,000 
The death toll from Pakistan’s earthquake soared to more than 73,000 and could still rise, 
according to official government figures. These are lower than those of other agencies, 
which estimate up to 87,000 dead. More than 3 million have been left homeless across 
Kashmir and North Western Frontier province.” (The Guardian Weekly 11-17 November, 
2005, p. 2. Example (4) in Cornish 2011).  
 
In (12), the proximal demonstrative pronoun these, subject of the second sentence, 
refers “‘strict’-anadeictically” to ‘the official Pakistani government figures (73,000 as of 
11th November 2005) on the death toll from Pakistan’s then recent earthquake’. This 
referent has just been evoked via a peripheral expression, the adjunct PP according to 
official (Pakistani) government figures in the initial sentence of the text. This is a 
sentence modifier/adjunct specifying the source of the claim made by the journalist in 
the main part of this initial sentence; as such, it occupies a backgrounded slot, under 
Khalil’s (2005) account. Indeed, this referent could not have been retrieved felicitously 
via a canonically anaphoric expression (here #they), since it is not in focus at the point 
of occurrence. This is why a proximal demonstrative pronoun was used to retrieve it, 
“strict-anadeictically”. Let us compare now what happens when an ordinary 3rd person 
pronoun is used to retrieve a referent of this kind:  
 
(13) “Militants want cleric freed 
A militant Palestinian splinter group, the Islamic Army, has demanded that Britain release a 
Muslim cleric in return for the freedom of BBC reporter Alan Johnston. He was kidnapped 
on March 12.” (The Guardian Weekly, 18/05/07, p. 2) 
 
In (13), we find a very similar situation — in terms of the utterance context of the 
indexical. Here, the 3rd person masculine singular human-denoting pronoun he, 
signalling canonical anaphora, is used to retrieve a referent introduced in a peripheral 
phrase within the initial sentence, the adjunct PP in return for the freedom of BBC 
reporter Alan Johnston. Note that there could be a comma (or a pause in the spoken 
version) between the words cleric and in here, showing that this adjunct may be a 
sentence modifier. This is analogous to the situation prevailing in example (12), where 
an anadeictic, not a canonical discourse-anaphoric, expression was used to this end.  
In fact, my feeling is that this use of he is infelicitous in this context. A more 
natural retrieval of this referent would have been via a reduced definite role-denoting 
NP, such as the journalist (cf. the definite NP the wave as used in line 9 in example 
(10)).17  In addition, the use of he results in anaphoric ambiguity here (at least at the 
point where the pronoun he is encountered), since the macro-topic entity in this text is 
the Muslim cleric (not identified by name) whose release is demanded by the 
Palestinian splinter group, the Islamic army. Indeed, the cleric is mentioned in the very 
title, which highlights the essential point of the text as a whole. Moreover, this referent 
                                                
17 Incidentally, this would provide support for the macro-syntactic relationship holding between the two sentences 
here (see the definite NP substitution test discussed in section 2 above). 
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is introduced in the body of the text via an indefinite NP in direct object position within 
a complement clause, a grammatical function higher in the hierarchy of grammatical 
relations than the adjunct PP introducing the second male referent.18  However, once the 
predicative component of the anaphoric sentence is taken into account, only the BBC 
reporter may be said to have been “kidnapped”; for the Muslim cleric is presupposed to 
be held in custody by Britain at the time of publication. So there is a conflict here 
between the import of ‘top-down’ and of ‘bottom-up’ contextual information.  
A key common feature in the four examples presented in this section concerns the 
topical status of the referent retrieved via the respective indexicals at the point where 
the retrieval occurs. In (10), the definite lexical NP the wave in line 9 is not anaphoric 
with respect to the contrastively-accented distal demonstrative pronoun THAT in the 
background (direct-speech) segment in line 8: for this is the first characterisation of the 
referent at issue as a “wave”, and contrastive THAT in line 8 is a deictic, not an 
anaphoric occurrence. The clause in which the NP the wave occurs clearly resumes the 
narration of the sequence of events as perceived by the narrator: the progress of the 
tsunami wave. Unlike the situation in (11), where a 3rd person pronoun and pronominal 
possessive determiner continue the macro-discourse topic already introduced and 
installed in the discourse within the main discourse unit preceding the direct-speech 
(background) interruption, in (10) the referent targeted by the NP the wave has not yet 
been installed in the discourse qua ‘wave’: it is only in line 9, immediately following 
the background direct-speech segment and closing it off as such, that this is achieved.  
By the time the background segment occurs, this introduction has not reached full 
completion. So it is only a lexically-headed indexical expression such as a full NP that 
could accomplish this task.  
In both (12) and (13), it is a referent with relatively low salience, introduced in a 
backgrounded segment, which is retrieved. In (12), this retrieval is realised felicitously 
via a demonstrative expression (a plural proximal demonstrative pronoun), but the use 
in (13) of a 3rd person pronoun is not a successful anaphoric retrieval, as we have seen. I 
would align (13), with the (more felicitous) use of a definite NP such as the journalist to 
retrieve the intended referent, with (10), which also involves the use of a definite lexical 
NP (the wave) as a retrieval device. For in (13) too, the referent to be continued in the 
indexical segment is not yet fully topical. An ordinary 3rd person pronoun or pronominal 
determiner could therefore not achieve this retrieval felicitously. Thus a role-denoting 
lexical indexical is called for in each case: in (10) in order to finally characterise the 
referent being introduced and so to bring it to full topical status; and in (13) to 
distinguish the male referent intended from the already more highly topical male 
referent introduced and installed as macro topic at the point where the retrieval is to be 
achieved. Again, only a lexically-headed expression could felicitously realise this 
indexical reference.   
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
First of all, our examples and discussion have shown, I think, contra what is argued in 
Unger (2006), that discourse is not a purely linear, “river-like” phenomenon, which 
“flows” along incrementally (though this may well be an accurate characterisation of 
                                                
18 Cf. the Centering theory algorithm which uses a grammatical relations hierarchy to predict which referent 
introduced via an NP realizing one or other nuclear or non-nuclear GR is most likely to be retrieved via a topical 
nominal expression in later utterances (see Walker et al. (eds.) 1998). 
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“text” in any context of use: see Table 1). There is a hierarchical structure to it, formed 
by segments assuming a foreground, midground or background relation with respect to 
other co-occurring segments; these segments may also be related paratactically, as 
“sister” units assuming the same “grounding” relation with respect to some other, 
dominating segment (see Walker 1998 on this point). The functioning of different types 
of indexicals in relation to entities evoked within these segments amply attests to this, as 
we have seen. For example, if an indexical expression refers in terms of a text segment 
which conveys presupposed information in relation to the host (anaphor-containing) 
segment, and the two segments contract a macro-syntactic relation with each other, then 
in order to achieve the reference intended, an expression realizing either ‘strict’ 
anadeixis or discourse deixis is normally used. In the former case, the referent will 
already be constructed and its discourse representation established in the prior discourse 
context; but in the latter, the referent has to be formed out of the relevant discourse 
context, in terms of what is predicated of this created referent. The use of a 
demonstrative-based expression together with its predicative context thus results in this 
referent not only coming into (discourse) existence, but being made salient and thus 
susceptible of being picked up again by a purely anaphoric expression. Table 3 in 
section 4 summarises the distinction.  
Examples (7)-(9) involved background segments which are in a micro-syntactic 
relation with regard to their containing clauses, in Berrendonner’s (1990), (2002) and 
Berrendonner et al.’s (forthcoming) terms, though the indexical-containing units are in a 
macro-structural one with regard to these segments as whole units; and the 
backgrounded segments in (10) and (11) are clearly in a macro-syntactic relation with 
respect to the more central discourse segments within which they occur. In (10) and 
(11), there is no subsequent reference within the “return-popping” (foreground) segment 
following the backgrounded one to an entity evoked within the latter. Interestingly, 
both references to what is objectively the same referent within the direct-speech 
background segments preceding the continuative (anadeictic or anaphoric) references 
are achieved deictically; and in each case also, these background segments evince a 
shift in locutionary source.  
Where a canonical discourse-anaphoric expression is used (typically a 3rd person 
pronoun), the referent must, as in the anadeictic case, be established as a salient entity in 
the context discourse representation; and correspondingly, it must also have been 
evoked within a foregrounded (or midgrounded) text segment, in Khalil’s (2005) terms 
(compare examples (12) and (13) in this regard, in particular) — unless the initial 
evocation and the anaphoric one both occur within a micro-syntactic sequence, in 
Berrendonner’s conception. Here, it is perfectly possible (indeed expected) for the 
retrieval to occur within a backgrounded segment — a status which usually corresponds 
to micro-syntactically related segments. Reduced definite NPs may be used felicitously 
both in the “‘strict’-anadeictic” and the discourse-anaphoric situations, though not in the 
“discourse deictic” one (see Table 3).  
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